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Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage
Hong Kong September 28-September 30
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CMPSAC.2004.134286728th Annual International Computer So ...
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Qianhong Wu, Changjie Wang, Xiaofeng Chen, Yumin Wang, "Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage," Computer Software and Applications Conference, Annual International, vol. 1, pp. 384-389, 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC'04), 2004.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/CMPSAC.2004.1342867,
author = {Qianhong Wu and Changjie Wang and Xiaofeng Chen and Yumin Wang},
title = {Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage},
journal ={Computer Software and Applications Conference, Annual International},
volume = {1},
year = {2004},
issn = {0730-3157},
pages = {384-389},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CMPSAC.2004.1342867},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
x 
 
TY - CONF
JO - Computer Software and Applications Conference, Annual International
TI - Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage
SN - 0730-3157
SP384
EP389
A1 - Qianhong Wu,
A1 - Changjie Wang,
A1 - Xiaofeng Chen,
A1 - Yumin Wang,
PY - 2004
KW - null
VL - 1
JA - Computer Software and Applications Conference, Annual International
ER -
 
Qianhong Wu, Xidian University
Changjie Wang, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Xiaofeng Chen, Sun Yat-sen University
Yumin Wang, Xidian University
Publicly verifiable sealed electronic auctions are proposed. The schemes enjoy the following advantages. They require no special trusted parties. After bid opening phase, only the winning price is revealed and the relation of other bidding amounts keep unknown. The winning price is publicly verifiable. Our scheme supports the first-price auction, Vickrey auction and (M+1)st-price auction. Finally, the first-price auction is very efficient and the generic (M+1)st-price auction is applicable when a high standard of security is required.
Citation:
Qianhong Wu, Changjie Wang, Xiaofeng Chen, Yumin Wang, "Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage," compsac, vol. 1, pp.384-389, 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC'04), 2004
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