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Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-Complete
Cape Breton, Novia Scotia, Canada June 11-June 13
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSFW.2001.93014514th IEEE Computer Security Foundatio ...
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Michaël Rusinowitch, LORIA-INRIA- Universit? Henri Poincar?
Mathieu Turuani, LORIA-INRIA- Universit? Henri Poincar?
Abstract: We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete in a Dolev-Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports nonatomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in order to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forge messages of polynomial size, provided that they are represented as dags.
Citation:
Michaël Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani, "Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-Complete," csfw, pp.0174, 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'01), 2001
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