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A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol
Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada June 24-June 26
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSFW.2002.102181615th IEEE Computer Security Foundatio ...
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Levente Buttyán, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne
Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology — Lausanne
Srdjan Capkun, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne
In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of a rational exchange protocol proposed by Syverson. A rational exchange protocol guarantees that misbehavior cannot generate benefits, and is therefore discouraged. The analysis is performed using our formal model, which is based on game theory. In this model, rational exchange is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium.
Citation:
Levente Buttyán, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Srdjan Capkun, "A Formal Analysis of Syverson?s Rational Exchange Protocol," csfw, pp.193, 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'02), 2002
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