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Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game
Rome, Italy October 17-October 19
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/FOCS.2004.2845th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundat ...
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Rahul Savani, London School of Economics
Bernhard von Stengel, London School of Economics
The Lemke-Howson algorithm is the classical algorithm for the problem NASH of finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. It provides a constructive and elementary proof of existence of an equilibrium, by a typical "directed parity argument", which puts NASH into the complexity class PPAD. This paper presents a class of bimatrix games for which the Lemke-Howson algorithm takes, even in the best case, exponential time in the dimension d of the game, requiring \Omega ((\theta ^{{3 \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {3 4}} \right. \kern-\nulldelimiterspace} 4}} )^d ) many steps, where Θ is the Golden Ratio. The "parity argument" for NASH is thus explicitly shown to be inefficient. The games are constructed using pairs of dual cyclic polytopes with 2d suitably labeled facets in d-space.
Citation:
Rahul Savani, Bernhard von Stengel, "Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game," focs, pp.258-267, 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'04), 2004
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