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Computing Cournot Equilibria in Two Settlement Electricity Markets with Transmission Constraints
Big Island, Hawaii January 05-January 08
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/HICSS.2004.10023Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii ...
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We formulate a two-settlement equilibrium in competitive electricity markets as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in which each generation .rm solves a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), given other firms? forward and spot strategies. We implement two computational approaches, one of which is based on a Penalty Interior Point Algorithm and the other is based on a steepest descent approach. We apply the algorithm to a six node illustrative example.
Citation:
"Computing Cournot Equilibria in Two Settlement Electricity Markets with Transmission Constraints," hicss, vol. 2, pp.20051b, Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'04) - Track 2, 2004
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