Integrative Negotiation In Complex Organizational Agent Systems

Halifax, Canada October 13-October 17

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http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/IAT.2003.1241060

2003 IEEE/WIC International Conferenc ...

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	ASCII Text	x
	Xiaoqin Zhang, Victor Lesser, Tom Wagner, "Integrative Negotiation In Complex Organizational Agent Systems," Intelligent Agent Technology, IEEE / WIC / ACM International Conference on, pp. 140, 2003 IEEE/WIC International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT'03), 2003.

	BibTex	x
	@article{ 10.1109/IAT.2003.1241060, author = {Xiaoqin Zhang and Victor Lesser and Tom Wagner}, title = {Integrative Negotiation In Complex Organizational Agent Systems}, journal ={Intelligent Agent Technology, IEEE / WIC / ACM International Conference on}, volume = {0}, year = {2003}, isbn = {0-7695-1931-8}, pages = {140}, doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/IAT.2003.1241060}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA}, }

	RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote	x
	TY - CONF JO - Intelligent Agent Technology, IEEE / WIC / ACM International Conference on TI - Integrative Negotiation In Complex Organizational Agent Systems SN - 0-7695-1931-8 SP EP A1 - Xiaoqin Zhang, A1 - Victor Lesser, A1 - Tom Wagner, PY - 2003 KW - null VL - 0 JA - Intelligent Agent Technology, IEEE / WIC / ACM International Conference on ER -

Xiaoqin Zhang, University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth

Victor Lesser, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Tom Wagner, Honeywell Laboratories

This paper introduces an integrative negotiation mechanism, which enables agents to choose any attitude from the extremes of self-interested and fully cooperative to those that are partially self-interested and partially cooperative. Experimental work verifies this mechanism and explores the question whether it always improves the social welfare to have an agent be completely cooperative. It is found that it is good for the organization to have agents being partially cooperative in their local negotiation with other agents rather than being fully cooperative, in order to deal more effectively with the uncertainty of not having a more informed view of the state of the entire agent organization.

Citation:

Xiaoqin Zhang, Victor Lesser, Tom Wagner, "Integrative Negotiation In Complex Organizational Agent Systems," iat, pp.140, 2003 IEEE/WIC International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT'03), 2003

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