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Non-Refundable-Bid Auctions for Positions in a Queue: A Decision-Theoretic Analysis
Halifax, Canada October 13-October 17
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/IAT.2003.12411442003 IEEE/WIC International Conferenc ...
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Pinata Winoto, Univ. of Saskatchewan, Canada
Tiffany Ya Tang, Univ. of Saskatchewan, Canada
In our previous work we investigated resource allocations among agents by means of legal/illegal behavior in the context of an M/D/I queuing model. Specifically, self-interested agents are deployed in a non-cooperative game: compete with each other to bid/bribe for quicker service provided by the server. In this paper, we extend our previous work and provide formal notions of more general queuing models, but restrict our discussion in a legal bid queue only. An analysis of their properties from decision theoretic perspective is discussed. We conduct an experiment to observe the advantage of various strategies.
Citation:
Pinata Winoto, Tiffany Ya Tang, "Non-Refundable-Bid Auctions for Positions in a Queue: A Decision-Theoretic Analysis," iat, pp.558, 2003 IEEE/WIC International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT'03), 2003
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