Security of Tzeng's Time-Bound Key Assignment Scheme for Access Control in a Hierarchy
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Abstract—Tzeng proposes a time-bound cryptographic key assignment scheme for access control in a partial-order hierarchy. In this paper, we show that Tzeng's scheme is insecure against the collusion attack whereby three users conspire to access some secret class keys that they should not know according to Tzeng's scheme.
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[3] S.M. Yen and C.S. Laih, Fast Algorithms for LUC Digital Signature Computation Proc. IEEE Computers and Digital Technology, vol. 142, no. 2, pp. 165-169, 1995.
Index Terms:
Access control, key assignment, RSA, collusion attack.
Citation:
Xun Yi, Yiming Ye, "Security of Tzeng's Time-Bound Key Assignment Scheme for Access Control in a Hierarchy," IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 1054-1055, July/Aug. 2003, doi:10.1109/TKDE.2003.1209023