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Delegate: A Proxy Based Architecture for Secure Website Access from an Untrusted Machine
Miami Beach, Florida, USA December 11-December 15
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ACSAC.2006.2322nd Annual Computer Security Applica ...
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Ravi Chandra Jammalamadaka, University of California, Irvine, USA
Timothy W. van der Horst, Brigham Young University, USA
Sharad Mehrotra, University of California, Irvine, USA
Kent E. Seamons, Brigham Young University, USA
Nalini Venkasubramanian, University of California, Irvine, USA
Performing sensitive online transactions using computers found in cybercaf?es and public libraries is risky. The untrusted nature of these machines creates a target rich environment. A simple keystroke logger, a common payload of many viruses, records and transmits the secret information (e.g., passwords, credit card numbers, PIN numbers) entered into these machines. In addition, sophisticated malware can hijack a user?s authenticated session to perform unauthorized transactions masquerading as the user.

This paper presents Delegate, a proxy-based architecture that enables a user to access web sites without disclosing personal information to untrusted machines. Delegate enforces rules at the proxy to detect and prevent session hijacking. This architecture leverages users? trusted mobile devices, e.g., cell phones, and requires no modification to web servers or the untrusted machines. Delegate is designed to provide a balance between security and usability.

Citation:
Ravi Chandra Jammalamadaka, Timothy W. van der Horst, Sharad Mehrotra, Kent E. Seamons, Nalini Venkasubramanian, "Delegate: A Proxy Based Architecture for Secure Website Access from an Untrusted Machine," acsac, pp.57-66, 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06), 2006
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