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An Optimal Round Two-Party Password-Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
Vienna, Austria April 20-April 22
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ARES.2006.29First International Conference on Ava ...
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Maurizio A. Strangio, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", ITALY

Key agreement protocols constitute one of the most valuable cryptographic primitives since they allow two (or more) users to setup a private and authenticated communication channel over a public network. This paper is concerned with key agreement protocols in the symmetric trust model, wherein the shared key is a password. This setting is very appealing from the user?s perspective since two parties, in principle, can easily agree on a shared password beforehand (e.g. on the telephone). However, designing such protocols represents an interesting challenge since there is no standard way of choosing a password that achieves an optimum trade-off between usability and security. Indeed, passwords belonging to a highly structured language (including PINs - Personal Identification Numbers) are essentially equivalent to low entropy strings.

A fundamental goal is that of obtaining secure and efficient protocols, with optimum computational complexity, round complexity and communication efficiency. These properties make them ideal candidates for mobile devices.

We present a new construction (DH-BPAKE) based on the encrypted key exchange protocol of Bellovin and Merritt augmented with an efficient key confirmation round. The communication model is asynchronous, meaning that each party can simultaneously send a message to the other party. In addition, we formally prove security in a modified version of the model of Boyko et al. (which is based on the model of Shoup).

Citation:
Maurizio A. Strangio, "An Optimal Round Two-Party Password-Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol," ares, pp.216-223, First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'06), 2006
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