The IEEE 802.11s working group is tasked to provide ways of establishing and securing a wireless mesh network. One proposal establishes a Mesh Security Architecture (MSA), with a developed key hierarchy and full protocol definitions. This paper examines the correctness and security of the MSA proposal and its corresponding protocols. We utilize Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) to prove individual protocols secure, as well as their composition. We add to the structure of PCL, generalizing it for peer-to-peer applications. We also discuss two security issues we discovered with original versions of the proposals and our proposed remedies.
Index Terms:
802.11s, Protocol Composition Logic (PCL), Mesh Security Architecture (MSA), peer-to-peer
Citation:
Doug Kuhlman, Ryan Moriarty, Tony Braskich, Steve Emeott, Mahesh Tripunitara, "A Correctness Proof of a Mesh Security Architecture," csf, pp.315-330, 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, 2008