loading...
Profiling Attacker Behavior Following SSH Compromises
Edinburgh, UK June 25-June 28
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/DSN.2007.7637th Annual IEEE/IFIP International C ...
 This Article 
 
PDF
HTML
 
 Share 
   
 Bibliographic References 
   
 Add to: 
 
Digg
Furl
Spurl
Blink
Simpy
Google
Del.icio.us
Y!MyWeb
 
 Search 
   
Daniel Ramsbrock, University of Maryland, USA
Robin Berthier, University of Maryland, USA
Michel Cukier, University of Maryland, USA
This practical experience report presents the results of an experiment aimed at building a profile of attacker behavior following a remote compromise. For this experiment, we utilized four Linux honeypot computers running SSH with easily guessable passwords. During the course of our research, we also determined the most commonly attempted usernames and passwords, the average number of attempted logins per day, and the ratio of failed to successful attempts. To build a profile of attacker behavior, we looked for specific actions taken by the attacker and the order in which they occurred. These actions were: checking the configuration, changing the password, downloading a file, installing/running rogue code, and changing the system configuration.
Citation:
Daniel Ramsbrock, Robin Berthier, Michel Cukier, "Profiling Attacker Behavior Following SSH Compromises," dsn, pp.119-124, 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN'07), 2007
Usage of this product signifies your acceptance of the Terms of Use.