Existing approaches for Trust Management through soft- ware alone ? by their very principle ? are uncompromising and have inherent weaknesses. Once the information leaves the service provider platform, there is no way to guaran- tee the integrity of the information on the client (or service requestor) platform. The Trusted Computing Group pro- posed a quantum leap in security, a hardware based "root of trust" by which the integrity of a platform ? be a client or service provider can be verified. However, there is no approach for the integration of this novel but essentially straight forward concept into the distributed application de- velopment. We believe that the complexity of Trusted Com- puting (TC) is one of the key factors that will hinder its suc- cessful integration within the web services based distributed application realm. Model-driven techniques offer a promis- ing approach to alleviate the complexity of platforms. This contribution has three objectives. First, we detail SECTET ? a model-driven framework for leveraging TC concepts at a higher level of abstraction. We secondly elaborate the integration of platform-independent XACML policies with the platform-specific SELinux policies. Thirdly, we share our experiences regarding the implementation results of the SECTET on TC based systems.