We illustrate how to employ metacircular assume/ guarantee reasoning to reduce the verification complexity of finite instances of protocols for safety, using nothing more than an explicit state model checker. The formal underpinnings of our method are based on establishing a simulation relation between the given protocol M, and several overapproximations thereof, \tilde M_1,..., \tilde M_k. Each \tilde M_i simulates M, and represents one "view" of it. The \tilde M_{i}s depend on each other both to define the abstractions as well as to justify them.We show that in case of our hierarchical coherence protocol, its designer could easily construct each of the \tilde M_i in a counterexample guided manner. This approach is practical, considerably reduces the verification complexity, and has been successfully applied to a complex hierarchical multicore cache coherence protocol which could not be verified through traditional model checking.