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Security for Authenticated Key Exchange Based on Non-Malleability
Sydney, Australia July 04-July 07
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ICITA.2005.249Third International Conference on Inf ...
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Hiroki Hada, Keisuke Tanaka, "Security for Authenticated Key Exchange Based on Non-Malleability," Information Technology and Applications, International Conference on, vol. 2, pp. 508-513, Third International Conference on Information Technology and Applications (ICITA'05) Volume 2, 2005.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/ICITA.2005.249,
author = {Hiroki Hada and Keisuke Tanaka},
title = {Security for Authenticated Key Exchange Based on Non-Malleability},
journal ={Information Technology and Applications, International Conference on},
volume = {2},
year = {2005},
isbn = {0-7695-2316-1},
pages = {508-513},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ICITA.2005.249},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
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TY - CONF
JO - Information Technology and Applications, International Conference on
TI - Security for Authenticated Key Exchange Based on Non-Malleability
SN - 0-7695-2316-1
SP508
EP513
A1 - Hiroki Hada,
A1 - Keisuke Tanaka,
PY - 2005
KW - null
VL - 2
JA - Information Technology and Applications, International Conference on
ER -
 
Hiroki Hada, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Keisuke Tanaka, Tokyo Institute of Technology
This paper continues the study of password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE). In 2000, Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [2] proposed the formal model on AKE. In this paper, we propose new security notions on AKE, based on the non-malleability of session keys. Then we prove that those security notion are equivalent to that proposed in [2]. Furthermore, we show that there is a protocol secure in the random oracle model, not always secure in the standard model with collision-resistant hash functions.
Citation:
Hiroki Hada, Keisuke Tanaka, "Security for Authenticated Key Exchange Based on Non-Malleability," icita, vol. 2, pp.508-513, Third International Conference on Information Technology and Applications (ICITA'05) Volume 2, 2005
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