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Enhancing Tit-for-Tat Strategy to Cope with Free-Riding in Unreliable P2P Networks
June 08-June 13
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ICIW.2008.122008 Third International Conference o ...
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Dongsheng Peng, Weidong Liu, Chuang Lin, Zhen Chen, Xuehai Peng, "Enhancing Tit-for-Tat Strategy to Cope with Free-Riding in Unreliable P2P Networks," Internet and Web Applications and Services, International Conference on, pp. 336-341, 2008 Third International Conference on Internet and Web Applications and Services, 2008.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/ICIW.2008.12,
author = {Dongsheng Peng and Weidong Liu and Chuang Lin and Zhen Chen and Xuehai Peng},
title = {Enhancing Tit-for-Tat Strategy to Cope with Free-Riding in Unreliable P2P Networks},
journal ={Internet and Web Applications and Services, International Conference on},
volume = {0},
year = {2008},
isbn = {978-0-7695-3163-2},
pages = {336-341},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ICIW.2008.12},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
x 
 
TY - CONF
JO - Internet and Web Applications and Services, International Conference on
TI - Enhancing Tit-for-Tat Strategy to Cope with Free-Riding in Unreliable P2P Networks
SN - 978-0-7695-3163-2
SP336
EP341
A1 - Dongsheng Peng,
A1 - Weidong Liu,
A1 - Chuang Lin,
A1 - Zhen Chen,
A1 - Xuehai Peng,
PY - 2008
KW - Peer-to-Peer
KW - incentive mechanism
KW - Tit-for-Tat
KW - free-riding
VL - 0
JA - Internet and Web Applications and Services, International Conference on
ER -
 
P2P applications suffer from free-riding. In economics terminology, free-riding is the rational behavior of the participants. So it's feasible to use game theory to analyze this problem and design countermeasures. Tit-for-Tat is a simple and efficient equilibrium strategy in repeated game environments. In this paper, we construct a game model in P2P environments and deduce the constraint under which the strict Tit-for-Tat is an equilibrium strategy. We then improve and adapt the Tit-for-Tat strategy to the dynamic property in P2P networks, and deduce the constraint under which it is still an equilibrium strategy. Finally we study through simulations the performance improvement of the enhanced Tit-for-Tat and give suggestion of how to choose proper system parameters under different network conditions.
Index Terms:
Peer-to-Peer, incentive mechanism, Tit-for-Tat, free-riding
Citation:
Dongsheng Peng, Weidong Liu, Chuang Lin, Zhen Chen, Xuehai Peng, "Enhancing Tit-for-Tat Strategy to Cope with Free-Riding in Unreliable P2P Networks," iciw, pp.336-341, 2008 Third International Conference on Internet and Web Applications and Services, 2008
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