The presence of "unwanted" (or background) traffic in the Internet is a well-known fact. In principle any network that has been engineered without taking into account the presence of unwanted traffic might experience troubles during periods of massive exposure to it, e.g. large-scale infections. A concrete example was provided by the spreading of Code-Red-II in 2001, which caused several routers crashes worldwide. Similar events might take place in 3G networks as well, with further potential complications due to the functional complexity and the scarcity of radio resources.

In this explorative paper we show that unwanted traffic is present also in GPRS/UMTS, mainly due to the widespread use of 3G connect cards for laptops. Based on a mixture of real-world measurements and theoretical speculations, we investigate the potential impact of such traffic onto the underlying network. We show that under certain hypothetical network configuration settings unwanted traffic, and specifically scanning traffic from infected Mobile Stations, can cause large-scale wastage of logical resources, and in extreme cases starvation.

We urge the research community and network operators to consider the issue of 3G robustness to unwanted traffic as a prominent research area. The goal of this paper is to trigger interest and at the same time move a first pioneering step in this direction.