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Lazy Revocation in Cryptographic File Systems
San Francisco, California December 13-December 13
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/SISW.2005.7Third IEEE International Security in ...
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Michael Backes, IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Switzerland
Christian Cachin, IBM Research Zurich Research Laboratory
Alina Oprea, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
A crucial element of distributed cryptographic file systems are key management solutions that allow for flexible but secure data sharing. We consider efficient key management schemes for cryptographic file systems using lazy revocation. We give rigorous security definitions for three cryptographic schemes used in such systems, namely symmetric encryption, message-authentication codes and signature schemes. Additionally, we provide generic constructions for symmetric encryption and message-authentication codes with lazy revocation using key-updating schemes for lazy revocation, which have been introduced recently. We also give a construction of signature schemes with lazy revocation from identity-based signatures. Finally, we describe how our constructions improve the key rotation mechanism in the Plutus file system
Citation:
Michael Backes, Christian Cachin, Alina Oprea, "Lazy Revocation in Cryptographic File Systems," sisw, pp.1-11, Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05), 2005
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