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Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software
Manchester, United Kingdom June 26-June 28
DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/WETICE.2006.5915th IEEE International Workshops on ...
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David P. Gilliam, John D. Powell, Matt Bishop, Chris Andrew, Sameer Jog, "Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software," Enabling Technologies, IEEE International Workshops on, pp. 319-325, 15th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE'06), 2006.
 
 
BibTex
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@article{ 10.1109/WETICE.2006.59,
author = {David P. Gilliam and John D. Powell and Matt Bishop and Chris Andrew and Sameer Jog},
title = {Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software},
journal ={Enabling Technologies, IEEE International Workshops on},
volume = {0},
year = {2006},
issn = {1524-4547},
pages = {319-325},
doi = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/WETICE.2006.59},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
address = {Los Alamitos, CA, USA},
}
 
 
RefWorks Procite/RefMan/Endnote
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TY - CONF
JO - Enabling Technologies, IEEE International Workshops on
TI - Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software
SN - 1524-4547
SP319
EP325
A1 - David P. Gilliam,
A1 - John D. Powell,
A1 - Matt Bishop,
A1 - Chris Andrew,
A1 - Sameer Jog,
PY - 2006
KW - null
VL - 0
JA - Enabling Technologies, IEEE International Workshops on
ER -
 
David P. Gilliam, California Institute of Technology, USA
John D. Powell, California Institute of Technology, USA
Matt Bishop, University of California at Davis, USA
Chris Andrew, PatchLink Corporation
Sameer Jog, PatchLink Corporation
Verification of the security of software artifacts is a challenging task. An integrated approach that combines verification techniques can increase the confidence in the security of software artifacts. Such an approach has been developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the University of California at Davis (UC Davis). Two security verification instruments were developed and then piloted on PatchLink?s UNIX Agent, a Commercial- Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software product, to assess the value of the instruments and the approach. The two instruments are the Flexible Modeling Framework (FMF) -- a model-based verification instrument (JPL), and a Property-Based Tester (UC Davis). Security properties were formally specified for the COTS artifact and then verified using these instruments. The results were then reviewed to determine the effectiveness of the approach and the security of the COTS product.
Citation:
David P. Gilliam, John D. Powell, Matt Bishop, Chris Andrew, Sameer Jog, "Security Verification Techniques Applied to PatchLink COTS Software," wetice, pp.319-325, 15th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE'06), 2006
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